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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA DON MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48571-2021 & 48584-2021
Cassia County Case Nos. CR16-18-940
& CR16-20-4236

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Joshua Don Martinez failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed concurrent sentences of 10 years with four years determinate for
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, imposed after a probation violation, and
five years with one year determinate for possession of methamphetamine?
ARGUMENT
Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
After a traffic stop, officers executed an arrest warrant on Martinez. (48571 R., pp. 18-19.)

A subsequent search of the car revealed over ten grams of methamphetamine in two bags. (48571
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R., p. 19.) The state charged Martinez with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver
and driving without privileges. (48571 R., pp. 28-29.) Martinez pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. (48571 R., pp. 52-56.) The district court imposed a
sentence of 10 years with four years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Martinez on
probation. (48571 R., pp. 102-04.)
About two months later the state alleged a probation violation for absconding supervision.
(48571 R., pp. 114-18.) Martinez admitted violating his probation and the district court executed
the sentence and retained jurisdiction. (48571 R., pp. 124-27.) After the period of retained
jurisdiction the district court ordered the sentence suspended and placed Martinez on probation.
(48571 R., pp. 130-36.)
About three months later the state alleged Martinez had violated his probation by
committing the new crimes of malicious injury to property, battery, possession of a controlled
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia; by associating with a parolees; and by using
methamphetamine.

(48571 R., pp. 140-45.)

The state criminally charged Martinez with

possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. (48584 R., pp. 16-17.)
Martinez admitted violating his probation and pled guilty to the new charge of possession of
methamphetamine. (48571 R., pp. 159-62; 48584 R., pp. 23-25, 44-47.) The district court revoked
probation on the possession with intent to deliver conviction and imposed a concurrent sentence
of five years with one year determinate on the possession conviction. (48571 R., pp. 182-83;
48584 R., pp. 63-65.)
Within 14 days of entry of judgment Martinez moved for reconsideration of the sentences.
(48571 R., pp. 188-89; 48584 R., pp. 79-80.) The district court denied the motions. (48571 R.,
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pp. 191-93; 48584 R., pp. 82-84.) Martinez filed timely notices of appeal. (48571 R., pp. 195-96;
48584 R., pp. 86-87.)
On appeal Martinez contends the district court erred by not placing him on probation in
both cases, and that his sentence for possession of methamphetamine is excessive. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 4-9.) Martinez’s argument is not supported by application of the law to the record in this
case.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation

is within the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461,
464 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the
defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
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261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Martinez Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
In determining whether to revoke probation, “the court examines whether the probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.” State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992).
The district court applied the correct legal standards to the issues before it. (12/7/20 Tr.,
p. 14, L. 18 – p. 15, L. 5.) The district court found that the most recent felony was committed
while on probation for the prior felony, and that this was Martinez’s “fourth adult felony” in
addition to “a significant juvenile record.” (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 10-14.) Martinez had “a long
4

history of substance abuse” and had been rejected for drug court. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 15-21.)
The district court concluded Martinez was not “an appropriate candidate for probation” based on
his history. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, L. 22 – p. 16, L. 1.) Martinez did not have a good disciplinary
record in custody. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-6.) The district court found Martinez was “an undue
risk” if put on probation immediately and continuing probation would “depreciate the seriousness”
not only of the new offense but of Martinez’s overall history. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 12-20.) “I
don’t think the defendant is a viable candidate to be supervised in the community and needs to be
held accountable.” (12/7/20 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 11-13.)
The record supports the district court’s analysis. Martinez does have a substantial juvenile
and adult criminal record, including two felony convictions before the first one in these cases.
(9/26/18 PSI, pp. 4-8; 11/20/20 PSI, pp. 2-3, 7-9.)

He committed the possession of

methamphetamine crime while on probation for possession of methamphetamine with intent to
deliver. He has been on probation, and has violated probation, several times. (9/26/18 PSI, p. 9;
48571 R., pp. 124-27, 182-83; 11/20/20 PSI, pp. 9-11.) Martinez was rated a high risk of reoffense. (11/20/20 PSI, pp. 2, 11.) He had several disciplinary reports in the jail. (11/20/20 PSI,
p. 3.) This record shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
Martinez was not a viable candidate for probation and imposed the sentence it did.
In arguing that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation, Martinez
asserts he was “progressing and probation was serving its purpose” and “[s]ociety was also
adequately protected.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) However, this argument is directly contrary
to the district court’s factual finding that Martinez was not “an appropriate candidate for
probation.” (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 22-24.) As set forth above, the record supports the district
court’s finding that Martinez was not a viable candidate for probation. Rather, he was a significant
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risk for continued criminal activity if placed on probation. Given Martinez’s repeated violations
of his probation, his counter-factual argument is without merit.
Martinez next contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a
sentence of five years with one year determinate for possession of methamphetamine, citing a
“combination of mitigating factors.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.) Those factors are his claimed
acceptance of responsibility, acknowledgement of his addiction, recognition of his desire to
change, “tumultuous childhood,” and “severe addiction.” (Id.) His argument hinges upon the
district court accepting Martinez’s assertions that despite prior failures to rehabilitate Martinez
was committed to his rehabilitation, this time. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 9, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 19 (trial counsel
arguing that Martinez should be given the opportunity to utilize his probation plan).) Of course
the district court specifically rejected that argument. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 15, L. 2 – p. 17, L. 23.)
The district court put its analysis on the record. It found Martinez was not “a viable
candidate to be supervised in the community and needs to be held accountable,” but that Martinez
was not “so far gone” that rehabilitation in the future was hopeless. (12/7/20 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 11-16;
see also p. 15, Ls. 22-24; p. 16, Ls. 14-20.) After considering the credit for time served (566 days),
----Martinez would be parole eligible about two and one-half years after sentencing. (48571 R., p.
185.) The district court reasonably concluded that two and one-half years’ incarceration, before
controlled release into the community, would facilitate Martinez’s rehabilitation and protect the
community.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
EMILY M. JOYCE
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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